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What can we learn from primitive law? – an in-depth analysis of the intersections 




Abstract: The subject of primitive law, the study of the various forces producing order 
and cohesion in a savage tribe, might lead us to investigate phenomena that from the point of view 
of Western societies are not included in the conventional study of law. Specifically, we will 
primarily analyze the meaning of reciprocity and secondly the difference between the law in 
breach and the restoration of order. 
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1. In the following pages I will consider Bronisław Malinowski’s concepts of law, 
legal obligation and legal rights from a legal and philosophical point of view.  
Malinowski was a famous Polish anthropologist1, known for his studies on the Kula Ring, 
a ceremonial exchange system of Papua New Guinea2, and for developing the theory of 
                                                   
1 Bronisław Malinowski (1884–1942) is arguably one of the most influential anthropologists of the 20th 
century. Born in Kraków, Poland, to an aristocratic family, Malinowski attended Jagiellonian University, 
receiving a PhD in philosophy, mathematics, and physics in 1908. In 1910 he pursued an interest in 
anthropology at the London School of Economics under the guidance of Charles. In 1914, while attending 
anthropological meetings in Australia, World War I broke out and, although technically an enemy alien and 
under some restrictions, he received financial assistance from the Australian government to conduct 
research among the people of Mailu, even if he wrote to his Master «dramatizing his enemy status in Papua 
as “a prisoner of war”», YOUNG, M. W., Odyssey of an Anthropologist. 1884-1920, Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London, 2004, p. 326. 
The list of his students includes Raymond Firth, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Audrey Richards, Edmund Leach, 
Ashley Montagu, Meyer Fortes and Isaac Schapera.  
2  The Kula ring spans many island communities of the Massim archipelago, including the Trobriand 
Islands, and involves thousands of individuals and it is a ceremonial exchange of red shell-disc necklaces 
(called soulava), traded to the north (circling the ring in clockwise direction), and white shell armbands 
(mwali), traded in the southern direction (circling counterclockwise), so that each necklace is exchanged 
for an armband and vice versa. It was firstly described by Malinowski in his main work, Argonauts of the 
Western Pacific. An account of native enterprise and adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New 
Guinea, Routledge, London, 1922. 
An interesting thing to specify is the fact that the Kula exchange is accompanied by general trade and it is 
a classic example of Marcel Mauss' distinction between gift and commodity exchange. See MAUSS, M., 
“Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques”, Année sociologique, 1923-
1924.  
participatory observation 3  (Argonauts of the Western Pacific, 1922). However, his 
analysis of primitive law (Crime and custom in primitive societies, 1926) and the legal 
significance of the Kula ceremonial exchange is less well-known.  
However, William Seagle, an American lawyer and jurist, has explored Malinowski’s 
ideas on law. He concluded that Malinowski’s functionalism «has exercised a pervasive 
influence upon modern jurisprudence, and he is really entitled to be regarded as the sire 
of realists, neo-realists and ultra-realists4». This is perhaps no surprise as, during World 
War II, Malinowski moved to Yale University at a time when its Law School was «the 
center of [the] legal realism movement 5 ». In an in-depth review of Llewellyn and 
Hoebel’s The Cheyenne Way (The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive 
Jurisprudence, 1941), for example, Malinowski argued for «the relevance of “primitive” 
legal studies to broader jurisprudential questions6». 
My aim is to illustrate that Malinowski’s theory of primitive law is interesting because it 
could be useful for re-defining law in multicultural and intercultural societies; a legal 
system reflects many facets of a society and this is the reason why some assumptions of 
the anthropology of law can be useful to understand our complex societies and the 
conflicts within.  
                                                   
3He stated that the aim of the anthropologist is «to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to 
realize his vision of his world» (Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Dutton 1961 edition, p. 25). It exhorted 
anthropologists to give up their comfortable position on the veranda of the missionary compound or 
government station and to go and live and work with the people they studied: participatory observation 
relied on the cultivation of personal relationships with local informants as a way of learning about a culture, 
involving both observing and participating in the social life of a group. As Young explains «Malinowski 
famously wrote of his arrival in the Trobriand Islands: “Imagine yourself suddenly set down surrounded by 
all your gear, alone on a tropical beach close to a native village, while the launch or dinghy that has brought 
you sails away out of sight”. The heroic figure of the lone ethnographer – or “the image of the old-fashioned 
castaway” – was a literary device, but close enough to the truth of Malinowski’s experience to serve as the 
opening image of the myth that he would spin of the archetypal Ethnographer. He transposed this arrival 
scene to the Trobriands, but it properly belongs to Mailu», seeYOUNG, M. W., Odyssey of an 
Anthropologist, p. 328. See also YOUNG M. W., The Ethnography of Malinowski. The Trobriand Islands 
1915-1918, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1979. When his personal diary, written 
during his fieldwork in Melanesia and New Guinea, was published posthumously in 1967 by his widow 
Valetta Swann set off a storm of controversy due to the private prejudices against his interlocutors expressed 
by the author. See URRY, J., FARDON, R., “Would the Real Malinowski Please Stand Up?”, Man, New 
Series, 27, 1, 1992, p. 179-182. 
4 SEAGLE, W., “Primitive Law and Professor Malinowski”, American Anthropologist, 39 (2), 1937, p. 290. 
5 CONLEY, J. M., O’BARR, W. M., “Back to the Trobriands: The Enduring Influence of Malinowski's Crime 
and Custom in Savage Society. Review of Crime and Custom in Savage Society”, Law & Social Inquiry, 27, 
4, 2002,  p. 854. 
6 Ibidem.  
Specifically, there two ideas that Malinowski promoted that this essay is concerned with. 
Firstly, he «questioned the thesis according to which law is a product of very few and 
therefore privileged societies7». Secondly, he «was the first to address the related issues 
of the nature and universality of law, indictively, literally from the ground up8». In these 
ways, Malinowski promoted the de-Westernization of law and, by doing so, can be 
compared to the position of legal post-modernism 9  that is critical of the supposed 
universality of the law and «rejects the belief in stable, transcontextual foundations10». 
To accomplish this aim, I will consider Malinowski’s broader scientific production. Isaac 
Shapera, the social anthropologist, points out that the concept of law expressed by 
Malinowski changed over time. Before his experience in the Trobriand Islands (The 
family among the Australian Aborigines: a sociological study, 1913),  Malinowski’s 
views on law were similar to the idea of social norms, insofar as he claimed that different 
types of norms were identifiable through the type of "social" or "collective" sanction with 
which they were associated. He defined legal norms as the norms that are followed by a 
direct, organized and defined social action (Malinowski’s Theory of Law, 2016). If these 
norms did not exist, in other words, the social reaction would be reduced to mere violence, 
and, on the other hand, without the social reaction the norms could not be defined as 
having a legal quality.  
The main difference that Shapera notices concerns Malinowski’s distinction between civil 
law and criminal law. In the first phase of Malinowski’s reflection, all the rules governing 
social life and strengthening social cohesion were included within the category of civil 
law, while the idea of the taboo – as prohibition, and as law in the broad sense, followed 
by some kind of supernatural sanction – were included within the category of criminal 
law. Even in Crime and Custom, Malinowski argued that what we call civil law, as 
                                                   
7 STĘPIEN M., “Malinowski’s Multidimensional Conception of Law: Beyond Common Misunderstandings”, 
in STĘPIEN M. (ed.), Bronisław Malinowski Concept of Law, Springer, Switzerland, 2016, p. 44. 
8 CONLEY, J. M., O’BARR, W. M., “Back to the Trobriands: The Enduring Influence of Malinowski's Crime 
and Custom in Savage Society”, cit., p. 866. 
9 See Paolo Grossi’ works such as Introduzione al Novecento giuridico, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2012 and 
L’invenzione del diritto, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2018. Grossi is a distinguished historian of law and Italian 
judge, former President of the Constitutional Court of Italy. He addressed legal pluralism as a 
characteristic of law in the Middle Ages and he criticizes the dominant legal reductionism, promoting the 
idea of law as a social institution.  
10 MINDA, G., Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence At Century's End, NYU Press, New 
York; London, 1995, p. 225 JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg2gf.17. See in general the chapter 
“Postmodern Jurisprudence”. 
opposed to criminal law, corresponds to a system of rules obeyed and respected.But, in 
the second phase of reflection, according to Shapera, our author explains the mechanism 
behind the obedience of civil laws as emerging from the idea of reciprocity, according to 
which a certain behavior is considered a duty for one individual and a legitimate right for 
another. In other words, reciprocity is based on the sense of duty and on the need for 
cooperation, and not on the fear of incurring a supernatural sanction:  
 
«the real reason why all these economic obligations 
are normally kept, and kept very scrupulously, is that 
failure to comply places a man in an intolerable 
position, while slackness in fulfillment covers him 
with opprobrium. The man who would persistently 
disobey the ruling of law in his economic dealings 
would soon find himself outside the social and 
economic order11». 
 
This set of rules, according to Malinowski, defines family relationships12 , marriage, 
economic relations and the exercise of power; on the other hand, "the fundamental rules 
that safeguard life, property and personality form the class which might be described as 
"criminal law13". 
                                                   
11 MALINOWSKI, B., Crime and custom in primitive societies, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Turner and Co, London, 1926, p. 41. 
12 The author states that the main principle of law in the Trobriand matrilineal society, which means that 
the lineage is traced maternally and not paternally as is the case in our societies (see MALINOWSKI, B., 
Sex and Repression in Savage Society, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1927 and The Sexual 
Life ofSavages in North-Western Melanesia. An Ethnographic Account ofCourtship, Marriage, and Family 
Life Among the Natives of the Trobriand Islands, British New Guinea, Eugenics Publishing, New York, 1929) 
is Mother-right. It  is the basis of the relationship of reciprocity between a man and his sister's family (in 
 The Father in Primitive Psychology, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co, London, 1927 Malinowski 
described the supposed ignorance of physiological paternity and questioned Freud's Oedipus complex in 
a matrilineal society). More generally, «what perhaps is more remarkable in the legal nature of social 
relations is that reciprocity, the give-and-take principle, reigns supreme also within the clan, nay within 
the nearest group of kinsmen. (…) the relation between the maternal uncle and his nephews, the relation 
between brothers, nay the most unselfish relation, that between a man and his sister, are all and one 
founded on mutuality and the repayment of services», MALINOWSKI, B., Crime and custom in primitive 
societies, 1926, cit, pp. 47-48.  
13 MALINOWSKI, B., Crime and custom in primitive societies, cit, 1926, p. 66. 
 2. Whilst the previous section considered how Malinowski’s ideas changed during 
his life, this section will explore his attitudes to law more generally. In Crime and Custom, 
Bronisław Malinowski proposes a “minimal definition” of law: legal norms are identified 
on the basis that in «all societies there must be a class of rules too practical to be backed 
up by religious sanctions, too burdensome to be left to mere goodwill, too personally vital 
to individuals to be enforced by an abstract agency 14 ». This definition implies a 
distinction between the legal world and the social world as a whole, which is made of 
moral and religious norms irreducible to the legal sphere. 
To fully grasp this conception, Malinowski argues that it is necessary to understand what 
the function of the law is. The fundamental function of law is to suppress certain natural 
propensities, to control human instincts and to impose non-spontaneous and coercive 
behaviour. The law thus ensures a kind of cooperation based on mutual concessions for a 
common purpose. This function seems to embody the possibility of building and 
maintaining human coexistence. The idea of repressing instincts recalls a position 
expressed by Norberto Bobbio, an italian philosopher of law and politics, a few decades 
later. He wrote that history can be imagined as an immense river embankment: the 
embankments are t6he rules of conduct, including religious, moral, juridical and social 
obligations. These rules contain the “current of passions”, like one’s interests and 
instincts, within certain limits and enable the formation of stable societies15.  
In the same work, Malinowski continues his exploration of social interaction by 
investigating the ritualized exchanges of fish and yams, the socalled wasi, routinely taking 
place between individuals of coastal and inland villages. «The idea of the reciprocities 
complex leads us to the historical or genetic dimension of social interaction16», writes 
Alvin Gouldner, an American anthropologist and sociologist. Gouldner explains how 
Malinowski, in his analysis of the Kula exchange, carefully emphasizes that gifts given 
are not immediately returned, and asks how one could understand this interval of time. 
He argues that this time period is governed by the norm of reciprocity in a double sense: 
«First, the actor is accumulating, mobilizing, liquidating or earnmaking resources so that 
                                                   
14 Ivi, p. 67.   
15 BOBBIO, N., Teoria generale del diritto, Giappichelli, Torino, 1993. 
16 GOULDNER, A. W., “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement”, American Sociological Review, 
25, 2, 1960, p. 174.  
he can make a suitable repayment. Second, it is a period governed by the rule that you 
should not do harm to those who have done you a benefit17». 
The principle of reciprocity is placed in the centre of Malinowski’s Crime and Custom, 
replacing a «narrow and rigid conception of the problem - a definition of “law” as a 
machinery of carrying out justice in cases of trespass18»:  
 
«the element or the aspect of law, that is of effective 
social constraint, consists in the complex 
arrangements which make people keep to their 
obligations. Among them the most important is the 
manner in which many transactions are linked into 
chains of mutual services, every one of them having 
to be repaid at some later date19». 
 
Firstly, «the rules of law stand out from the rest in that they are felt and regarded as the 
obligations of one person and the rightful claims of another»; secondly, «thay are 
sanctioned not by a mere psychological motive, but by a definite social machinery of 
binding force, based, as we know, upon mutual dependance, and realized in the equivalent 
arrangement of reciprocal services, as well as in the combination of such claims into 
strands of multiple relationship20».  
As Laura Nader explains in her essay The Anthropological Study of Law, as far as the 
debate in the anthropological field is concerned, the theme of universal characteristics of 
law remained in the background until Malinowski's reflection21. It is in the context of the 
search for the universal characteristics of law that the choice to adhere to a functional 
definition rather than a formal one must be framed; it places a significant distance from 
                                                   
17 Ibidem. 
18 MALINOWSKI, B., Crime and Custom in Savage Society, cit., p. 31. 
19 Ivi, p. 32. 
20 Ivi, p. 55.  
21 NADER, L., “The Anthropological Study of Law”, American Anthropologist. New Series, 67, 6, 1965, pp. 
6-8. 
the formal position adopted by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown,  who is considered, together with 
Malinowski, as the father of British modern social anthropology. 
According to Malinowski, the definition of law must be framed within the functional and 
institutional analysis of cultural responses to the fundamental biological needs of 
individuals. The Polish anthropologist makes two additional points to support this 
position. Firstly, he argues that all primary problems of human beings are solved through 
organization in cooperative groups, and also through the development of knowledge of 
values and ethics (A Scientific Theory8 of Culture and Other Essay, 1942). Secondly, he 
states that fundamental needs and cultural satisfaction can generate new cultural needs 
imposed by the tendency to extend security and well-being.  
 
3. In the last phase of his life, Malinowski repositioned the centrality of the 
principle of reciprocity in his aforementioned review of The Cheyenne Way. he argued 
that law is a system of principles deeply rooted in the way in which human culture and 
society develop. Law constitutes, first and foremost, the framework that outlines the 
establishment of the institutions through which men organise the collective dimension of 
their existence. With these arguments, Malinowski maintained a distance from the 
Austinian-Benthamian paradigm, and retained ideas produced by the Historical School of 
Law and some insights of juridical realism and and anti-formalistic theories. This 
perspective also led him to compare primitive and codified  legal systems:  
 
«The authors are fully aware that the cross-
fertilization of jurisprudence by the study of primitive 
law is beneficial for both. In the study of communities 
where law is neither codified nor administered before 
courts, nor yet enforced by constabulary, certain 
problems arise which can be easily overlooked in a 
jurisprudence based on our own formal and 
crystallized systems. Why have men to obey certain 
rules? Why have such rules to be known by the actors, 
formulated, and made valid? Why is the validity of 
some such rules never questioned, while others seem 
to offer constant temptation to breach?22» 
 
Mateusz Stępień, a contemporary Polish sociologist of law, analyzed conceptions of law 
from biological23, social and psychological perspectives. In any partial process of culture, 
men, organized and fitted out with artifacts, follow the rules of technique determined by 
what he improperly called natural law. The same could be said of any other technical 
achievement by concerted and organized action, like the co-ordination of food gathering, 
hunting, fishing or agriculture.  Such rules carry a sociological quota and are symbolically 
formulated. This «is the universal determinism based on the fact that man has always 
primarily to satisfy his basic organic needs; that in doing this by creating the artificial 
environment of culture, he [man] has to act under conditions of order, continuity, 
predictability, and authority24». Thus, 
 
«in all this the fundamental rules of behavior defining 
the relations between individuals and groups re-
appear once more, as an integral part of the 
determinism of culture. Agreements between 
individuals through contract; rules of conduct based 
on birth and status; reciprocal concatenations of 
duties which establish such typical relations as 
between husband and wife, parents and children, 
kinsmen and clansmen; the duties and privileges of 
status, rank, and authority, occur throughout and are 
invariably true to type25». 
 
                                                   
22 MALINOWSKI, B., “A new instrument for the study of law – especially primitive”, The Yale Law Journal, 
51, 8, 1942, p. 1238.  
23 Stępień states that Malinowski’s position «is best described as “soft” naturalism», instead of cultural 
determinism. See STĘPIEN M. “Malinowski’s Multidimensional Conception of Law: Beyond Common 
Misunderstandings”, in STĘPIEN M. (ed.), Bronisław Malinowski Concept of Law, cit. p. 47.  
24 MALINOWSKI, B., A new instrument for the study of law – especially primitive, cit., p. 1241. 
25 Ibidem. 
Malinowski was aware that «the term law obviously means in this context something 
essentially different from law as rule traditionally established or promulgated, obeyed, or 
broken and enforced26». Nonetheless, all these laws had to be transmitted from generation 
to generation, either verbally or in standardized behavior. An important distinction thus 
arises between «(1) rules of cultural determinism accepted, but neither known nor stated; 
and (2) rules explicitly standardized and formulated in early symbolic gesture or 
sound27». Within this second type, there is a further distinction between two aspects: 
firstly, those rules whose sanction is automatic and consists in the ineffectiveness, namely 
all those rules underlying cooperation in technical activities; and, secondly, those rules 
whose sanction instead derives from the convenience of conformity to tradition, or the 
conventions that regulate human relations in daily life ‒ in this sense, one can emphasize 
that there is no real difference between the value of uniformity and standardization of 
behaviour in a primitive society or in our contemporary mass society ‒. Malinowski 
unpacks this idea as follows:  
 
«As soon as a rule curbs certain physiological 
propensities or delimits the advantages and claims of 
two or more parties, there enters the element of 
divergent interest. Thus rules referring to the 
distribution of food, rules related to sex, to authority, 
to privilege, and duty respectively; all the rules which 
impose more effort and less reward on a class, group, 
or individual for the advantage of another, have to be 
sanctioned. Here enter also the rules which protect 
life and property, and prevent bodily harm between 
individuals, that is, rules of criminal law. There must 
exist in all these cases definite codes known and 
accepted by those concerned. There is here always a 
temptation to evade, to stretch, or to break such rules. 
Hence disputes, early forms of litigation and of 
adjustment do occur at a primitive level. In the course 
                                                   
26 Ivi, p. 1242. 
27 Ibidem.  
of evolution the stretching and the breaking of law 
produce the machinery of law in our modern sense28». 
 
This passage in A New Instrument for the Study of Law, points towards two extra 
meanings of Malinowski’s conception of law: (3) «rules of conduct which refer to 
relations between individuals and groups, delimit divergent interests, and curtail 
disruptive physiological and sociological tendencies»; and, last but not least, (4) «the 
specific mechanism which is brought into existence when a conflict of claims arises or a 
rule of social conduct is broken29», the law of order and law maintained, on the one hand, 
and the retributive and restitutive social action, on the other.  
Refusing to apply legal Western categories to primitive societies, Malinowski examined 
the “Law in Breach” and the “Restoration of Order” within a theoretical perspective based 
on the idea of different systems of laws-in-conflict. Since, in Western tradition, central 
authority, codes, courts and constables are supposed to exist in order to enforce laws, 
many anthropologists had thought that law was followed spontaneously and automatically 
in native communities30, producing in their minds the image of individuals in native 
communities as robots with no free will. On the contrary, Malinowski insisted on the 
existence of binding obligations which could be classified as legal rules31. 
The main difference between primitive law and our modern legal system is pretty clear 
according to our author:  
 
                                                   
28 Ivi, 1243. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 See HARTLAND, E. S., Primitive Law, Methuen & Company Limited, London, 1924 and LOWIE, R. H., 
Primitive Society, Boni and Liveright, New York, 1920.  
31 In such a framework, we should underline the function of two main influences of criminal law: on the 
one hand, the importance of sorcery as a force of conservation and maintenance of the established order, 
and on the other hand, the imperative to commit suicide when the illegal action accomplished is 
particularly serious. The analysis of sorcery and suicide shows the essentially private nature of the 
Melanesian penal justice; crimes that affect people in life, in safety, in property, in honor are private affairs 
to be dealt with among those who are involved, their families and friends, but not public authorities. The 
private and “negotiating” dimension of this kind of criminal justice can be deduced from the fact that the 
law of retaliation could be replaced by the “price of the blood” (called lula in native language), an 
institution formerly born in the context of the stipulation of peace after a war. It was the idea to give 
compensation to the enemy part for any man killed or wounded, and it was then transplanted in cases of 
murder, as a retribution involving part of the community. 
«the lawyer qua craftsman must primarily be 
interested in law breaking, in guiding of the clients' 
conduct so as to prevent punishment if not breach, in 
framing contracts and effecting compromises. All this 
brings about his professional involvements and his 
financial emoluments. The sociologist and the 
ethnographer on the other hand must primarily be 
interested in the working of social control, that is, in 
the maintenance of order32». 
 
In the last pages of this last wor, Malinowski reiterated the importance of considering all 
the meanings of the term law, not just the fourth. As Stępień points out when describing 
the social dimensions of law, in fact, «the main goal of law is to provide continuity of 
mutual services and to enable people to fulfill their obligations33», and to co-operate.  
And this statement seems to be valid also in relation to the future: «the foundations of the 
future international law of collective security, collective prosperity, and collective 
interchange of universally human services will have to be built on order, and on the vision 
of what must come34». These words reflect the author's hope during World War II. 
 
4. More generally, the idea of relationality as a constitutive social factor is an  
understanding that can be found, though with different nuances of meaning, in many 
authors ‒they have traced historiographically the anti-formalistic theories of law, from 
the supporters of the Interessenjurisprudenz, to those who identified themselves with the 
Freirechtzbewegung, and to the French authors of the Belle Époque ‒. However, the 
thinker whose thought seems closer to Malinowski is Eugen  Ehrlich. Precisely because 
of the distinction just mentioned, Ehrlich, in fact, maintains that the organization of 
                                                   
32 Ivi, 1246. 
33 STĘPIEN M. “Malinowski’s Multidimensional Conception of Law: Beyond Common Misunderstandings”, 
in STĘPIEN M. (ed.), Bronisław Malinowski Concept of Law, cit., p. 49. 
34 MALINOWSKI, B., A new instrument for the study of law – especially primitive, cit., p. 1248. 
society is constituted first of all by the spontaneous and general observance of the rules 
that have been established, rather than on the coercive-sanctioning aspect35. 
Another parallel can be drawn with the socalled legal institutionalism, an approach to the 
theory of law developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries  in continental 
Europe by a number of scholars who were opposed to statalism and normativism36. The 
key concept for authors such as Maurice Hauriou and especially Santi Romano is the 
notion of institution. In particular, the Italian jurist advanced a definition of law as a 
juridical order, a notion which in turn leads back to that of institution, meaning any social 
entity37. In relation to the institution, as far back as The Sexual Life of Savages (1929), 
Malinowski proposed that society consists of a series of organized systems of behavior, 
or institutions, writing that family must be understood as the cell of society, the 
fundamental nucleus that, at the same time, constitutes the origin and the foundation of 
the emerging human organization. Stępień, on the other hand, underlines that: 
 
«Malinowski did not commit the functionalist fallacy 
in that all social institutions exist because they serve 
certain functions to the society in which they are 
practiced. When analyzing law as part of the 
Trobriand’s social world, he took a heuristic 
hypothesis of its functionality, knowing that there 
might be other possibilities (1926a, p. 74; 1936a, p. 
449; 1944/1961, p. 170). He pointed out that the 
world of culture is not consistent, but rather a 
dynamic whole within which there are also some 
contradictions38». 
 
                                                   
35 See EHRLICH, E., Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, Duncker and Humblot, Munich und Leipzig, 
1913. 
36 See PINTORE A., “Institutionalism in Law”, in Craig, E. (gen. ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Version 1.0, 1998. 
37 See ROMANO, S., L’ordinamento giuridico (Juridical Order), Florence, Sansoni, (1917-18),2nd edn, 1946. 
38 STĘPIEN M. “Malinowski’s Multidimensional Conception of Law: Beyond Common Misunderstandings”, 
in STĘPIEN M. (ed.), Bronisław Malinowski Concept of Law, cit., pp. 49-50. 
At this point in my argument, I have to mention the Malinowskian position on the 
difference between positive or negative interpretations of human nature from an 
anthropological point of view. The reference to the "biological imperative of self-
preservation" is not the premise for an intrinsically warlike definition of human nature; 
on the contrary, the norm of reciprocity is independent of the claim to define the original 
and fundamental characteristics of human nature 39 . We cannot derive a positive or 
negative vision of the human being as we can find in Jean-Jacques Rousseau or in Thomas 
Hobbes respectively. In other words, the functional analysis presented by Malinowski 
does not coincide with an ontologically defined assumption; the emergence of 
cooperation and social solidarity is explained by the need to satisfy basic needs, rather 
than in terms of an ontologically precultural gregariousness40. We can nevertheless state, 
therefore, that according to Malinowski «to be human is to live in cooperative groups, 
which entails the presence of legal forms 41 », and also, specifically, reciprocal 
relationships. 
As I stated at the beginning, the subject matter is an area of civil law. But what can we 
say about criminal law? James M. Donovan points out that the category of reciprocity is 
nowhere mentioned in the second section of Crime and Custom in Savage Society, which 
is dedicated precisely to criminal law. This means that criminal law cannot be explained 
by the same category of reciprocity, and the consequences that can be drawn are 
theoretically relevant: «if criminal law cannot be explained by reciprocity, or by some 
structurally similar element that is equally “inherent in the structure” of societies, 
Malinowski cannot argue that criminal law is culturally universal in the same way he had 
just achieved for civil law42».  
This brings us back to the importance of the third meaning of the concept of law identified 
in the review of The Cheyenne Way: the law of order and law maintained. This is exactly 
what we can learn from the study of primitive law. 
 
                                                   
39 MALINOWSKI, B., “The Deadly Issue”, Athlantic Monthly, 158, 1936, pp. 659-669 and Malinowski’s 
Archive, LSE Library, MALINOWSKI/22/3.  
40 See MALINOWSKI, B., The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia. An Ethnographic Account 
of Courtship, Marriage, and Family Life Among the Natives of the Trobriand Islands, cit., 1929. 
41 DONOVAN, J. M., “Reciprocity as a Species of Fairness: Completing Malinowski’s Theory of Law”, in 
STĘPIEN M. (ed.), Bronisław Malinowski Concept of Law, cit., p. 88. 
42 Ivi, 89. 
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